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Abstract 
In this study, we examine the effectiveness of the individual-punishment 
mechanism in larger groups, comparing groups of four to groups of 40 participants.  We 
find that the individual punishment mechanism is remarkably robust when the MPCR is 
held constant despite the coordination problems inherent in an institution relying on 
decentralized individual punishment decisions in the context of a larger group. This 
reflects increased per-capita expenditures on punishment that offset the greater 
coordination difficulties in the larger group. However, if the marginal group return stays 
constant, resulting in an MPCR that shrinks with group size, no such offset occurs and 
punishment loses much but not all of its effectiveness at encouraging voluntary 
contributions to a public good. 
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Group Size, Coordination, and the Effectiveness of the Punishment Mechanism in 
the VCM: An Experimental Investigation 
I. Introduction 
The voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) has been an important topic of 
research in experimental economics.  Among the many issues addressed by laboratory 
experiments is the relationship between group size and the level of contributions. Isaac, 
Walker and Williams (1994) examined group sizes from four to 100, while 
simultaneously manipulating the marginal per-capita return (MPCR) between 0.04 and 
0.75. Their main results show that with the MPCR held constant at 0.3, groups of 40 and 
100 provide the public good at higher levels of efficiency than groups of 4 and 10 
respectively.  However, for an MPCR of 0.75, group size had no significant effect on 
public good provision.  
In a separate line of research, Fehr and Gächter (2000; 2002) demonstrated that 
informing individual contributors of the contributions made by their peers, and then 
permitting those contributors to purchase punishments directed at individuals they specify 
is a remarkably effective means of motivating high contributions among groups of four 
participants.  This is true under both partner and stranger designs. This result is especially 
noteworthy because the availability of these punishment opportunities does not alter the 
fact that complete free riding in contributions is still the unique stage-game Nash 
Equilibrium for the VCM with or without punishment opportunities. 
A number of studies have examined the robustness of Fehr and Gächter’s results 
with respect to punishment effectiveness and cost (Egas and Riedl, 2008; Nikiforakis and 	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Normann, 2008; Gardner and West, 2004), communication (Bochet, Page, and 
Putterman, 2006), self-selection of punishment versus non-punishment institution 
(Gürerk, Irlenbusch, and Rockenbach, 2006), monetary versus non-monetary punishment 
(Masclet et al., 2003), length of the game (Gächter, Renner, and Sefton, 2008), alternative 
punishment institutions (Casari and Luini, 2009), and country (Herrmann, Thöni, and 
Gächter, 2008).
1 Carpenter (2007) compares groups consisting of five versus ten 
participants.  He also controls for the extent to which subjects can monitor each other. 
His results show that the availability of punishment promotes contributions for both 
groups of five and groups of ten, but that restrictions on monitoring can adversely affect 
contributions.  
The effectiveness of the individual punishment mechanism in laboratory groups 
of four, five or ten provides a persuasive explanation of how free-riding behavior can be 
mitigated in relatively small groups that need to mobilize contributions of money or 
effort towards a common public good.  However, it is uncertain whether such a 
mechanism would continue to be effective in the much larger groups that must often 
cooperate together for the common good. Carpenter (2007) finds that in ten-person 
groups there is some evidence that individuals punish less because of a bystander effect, 
i.e second-order free riding in bearing the cost of punishment. He finds however that this 
is largely offset by the presence of more potential punishers. Casari (2005) notes that 
Carpenter’s design employs a punishment mechanism with a fine-to-fee ratio that 
increases with group size. As Casari points out, a higher fine-to-fee ratio has been 
associated with increased expenditures on punishment (Anderson and Putterman, 2006; 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
1 Related literatures examine rewards versus punishments (e.g., Rand et al., 2009) and the evolutionary 
emergence of punishment (e.g., Boyd, Gintis and Bowles, 2010). 	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ
Andreoni, Harbaugh, and Vesterlund, 2003; Carpenter, 2002; Egas and Riedl, 2008; 
Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008; Gardner and West, 2004; Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner, 
1992). This could have motivated more punishment expenditures in Carpenter’s  ten-
person than in his five-person groups, mitigating the potential coordination problem in 
the ten-person groups. 
As group size increases, potential coordination problems in the individual 
punishment mechanism multiply if each subject trying to decide whether or not to punish 
a low contributor is unable to observe which of those low contributors may be 
simultaneously receiving punishments from others. The primary objective of our study is 
thus to examine the robustness of the individual-punishment mechanism at a constant 
fine-to-fee ratio in the context of the potential coordination problems that may occur in 
larger groups. In particular, we follow Isaac, Walker and Williams (1994) in comparing 
groups of four versus 40 participants. In our four person-groups, the MPCR was set at 
0.4.  This implies a marginal group return (MGR) of 0.4·4 = 1.6, i.e. each contribution of 
one token results in 1.6 tokens divided equally among the four-person group.  In half of 
our 40-person groups, we held the MPCR constant at 0.4, resulting in a MGR of 0.4·40 = 
16, i.e. each contribution of one token creates 16 tokens divided equally among the 40-
person group. In the other half of our 40-person groups, we held the MGR constant at 1.6, 
resulting in a reduced MPCR of just 0.04. Of course, we would expect the high-MPCR 
group to contribute more to the public good than the low-MPCR group with or without 
punishment. We also hypothesize that punishment will be more effective at raising 
contributions in the high- than in the low-MPCR group.  This is because there is greater 
motivation to punish low contributors when their increased contributions would have a 	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ
greater effect on one’s earnings.   
It is less clear how an increase in group size with a constant MPCR would 
influence the effectiveness of the individual punishment mechanism.  On the one hand, 
the increase in MGR might be expected to encourage the punishment of low contributors 
by those who care about the larger potential social surplus.  On the other hand, the 
coordination problem described above may cause free-riding to take hold if some low 
contributors are not initially punished. 
II. Experimental Design 
Our specific experimental design adopted key elements from Fehr and Gächter’s 
two important studies (2000; 2002). Like them, we employed a within-person design of 
punishment (P) versus non-punishment (N) conditions. In particular, each subject played 
ten rounds of N and ten rounds of P in a session. The order of P and N was reversed for 
half of the sessions. Following Fehr and Gächter (2000; 2002), we initially told the 
participants that they would be playing ten rounds in either the P or N condition. 
Afterwards, they were informed that they would be playing ten more rounds in a new 
experiment, and that the session would finish after this second set of ten rounds was 
played. We used a partner protocol both because of the practical difficulties of using a 
stranger design with 40-person groups and in order to focus on large groups that may 
have repeated opportunities for cooperation.  We used scrambled IDs from round to 
round so that no reputation could be built over time. The fine-to-fee ratio was set at 3:1 as 
in Fehr and Gächter (2002). Thus, spending one token to punish another person resulted 
in a three-token loss for that person. This ratio did not vary with either group size or 	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ
MPCR. 
Each subject was endowed with 20 tokens for each round and another 25 (500) 
tokens at the beginning of the P condition when group size was equal to 4 (40).  The 
exchange rate was set at 21 Tokens = 1 RMB for group size = 4 and 39.23 (150) Tokens 
= 1 RMB for group size = 40 with MPCR = 0.04 (0.4). These exchange rates were 
calculated by holding the mean of the free-riding payoff and the full-contribution payoff 
plus the 25 (500) tokens for the four- (40-) person P condition equal in RMB between 
these treatments. Lastly, each subject was also given a 10 RMB show-up fee. As in Fehr 
and Gächter (2000; 2002), a subject who did not punish others could not lose money.  
Punishment points received could not reduce income from the contribution stage of the 
game to less than zero.  However, spending money on punishing others created the 
possibility of losing money.  For example, if one received enough punishment points to 
reduce one’s earnings from the contribution stage to zero, any punishment points 
previously purchased would result in a loss. The purpose of the 25 (500) tokens received 
at the beginning of the P rounds for the four- (40-) person groups was to mitigate the 
possibility of somebody leaving the session owing the experimenter money.
2  This did 
not occur. 
In summary, there are three independent variables: group size (four versus 40), 
MPCR (0.04 and 0.4), and decision order (NP and PN). MGR is the product of group size 
and MPCR. Since the MPCR of 0.04 could only be used for 40-person groups, there were 
six treatments in total: 
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1.  Small group (4), PN, MPCR = 0.4, MGR = 1.6, ten groups 
2.  Large group (40), PN, MPCR = 0.4, MGR = 16, three groups 
3.  Large group (40), PN, MPCR = 0.04, MGR = 1.6, three groups 
4.  Small group (4), NP, MPCR = 0.4, MGR = 1.6, ten groups 
5.  Large group (40), NP, MPCR = 0.4, MGR = 16, three groups 
6.  Large group (40), NP, MPCR = 0.04, MGR = 1.6, three groups 
Subjects were randomly recruited via online advertisements at Zhejiang 
University in Hangzhou, China. All subjects were full-time undergraduate students in 
diverse majors across the Sciences, Social Sciences, and Humanities. A total of 560 
subjects participated in the study. All sessions were run at the Zhejiang University 
Experimental Social Science Laboratory.  
All sessions were computerized.
3 Upon arrival, each subject was seated at a 
private computer carrel. Each session lasted about 100 minutes. The average earnings for 
each subject were approximately 39.6 RMB including a 10 RMB show-up fee. At the 
time of the experiment, 39.6 RMB was equal to about $5.82 US. For comparison 
purposes, the wage rate for Zhejiang University undergraduates who had part-time jobs 
with the university administration was 12 RMB per hour.  
III. Results 
Table 1 presents a data summary by treatment of the sum of contributions per 
capita in the punishment rounds, in the non-punishment rounds and the difference 
between them.  In all cases, the differences between contributions in the P condition and 
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contributions in the N condition are positive and significantly different from zero as 
indicated by the p-values from simple t-tests using group-level data, which are in 
parentheses below the calculated differences.  
Table 2 presents regression results using individual data with random effects for 
each group. The dependent variable is the difference between contributions over all ten 
rounds of the P condition and contributions over all ten rounds of the N condition for 
each individual participant. The independent variables are all dummy variables 
representing the different treatments. Coding the dummy variables in a variety of ways 
permits us to run different hypothesis tests of interest.  Thus, we report the results of this 
regression with six different permutations of dummy-variable codings. Each coding uses 
a different treatment as the reference group, represented by the constant term. The coding 
numbers at the top of each column correspond to the treatment numbers in Table 1, 
indicating the reference group for each coding. To correctly interpret the meaning of the 
independent dummy variables, recall that both high MGR and low MPCR occur only 
when the group size is large. 
The first thing to notice is that all of the constant terms are significant with p-
values less than 0.01.  This confirms the results of the t-tests presented in Table 1. 
Punishment made a significant difference to contributions in all six treatments.  Second, 
in the NP order, the effectiveness of punishment at increasing contributions is 
significantly lower in the low-MPCR than in the high-MPCR large-group treatment (p = 
0.044). Third, in the NP order, the effectiveness of punishment at increasing contributions 
is also significantly lower in the low-MPCR large-group treatment than in the small-
group treatment (p = 0.009). ).  Fourth, there is no significant difference in the 	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effectiveness of punishment related to group size for a constant high MPCR in the NP 
order.   Fifth, there is a significant order effect in the small-group treatment with 
punishment being less effective in the PN order (p = 0.007). Sixth, nothing is significant 
in the PN order. 
It may take time for participants to adjust to the change of condition.  Thus, it is 
interesting to examine the analogous results for the last round under each condition. 
Table 3 reports these results. The constant terms are significant for both the small-group 
(p = 0.000 for both NP and PN orders) and high-MPCR large-group (p = 0.000 for NP 
order and p = 0.001 for PN order) treatments, indicating that punishment makes a 
significant difference in these cases. However, in contrast to the ten-round average data, 
the constant terms are not significant for the low-MPCR large-group treatment. Thus, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that punishment makes no difference to the level of 
contributions when the MPCR is low. In the NP order, the effectiveness of punishment at 
increasing contributions is significantly lower in the low-MPCR large-group treatment 
than in the small-group treatment (p = 0.005) and lower but with just marginal 
significance in comparison with the high-MPCR large-group treatment (p = 0.070). In the 
PN order, there is a significant difference in the effect of punishment only between the 
low-MPCR large-group and small-group treatments (p = 0.052). The effectiveness of 
punishment is not significantly influenced by group size for a constant high MPCR in 
either the NP or PN order. 
In contrast to the ten-round average data, none of the order effects or interactions 
involving order effects is individually significant for the last-round data. Moreover, a 
joint test that the coefficients on the main order effect together with those on its 	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interactions with the two other treatment dummies all equal zero yields a Chi-Square 
statistic of 1.95 with three degrees of freedom (p = 0.583). This suggests that the 
observed differences between the effectiveness of punishment in the NP versus the PN 
order have to do with the transition from N to P relative to the transition from P to N, and 
vanish by the tenth repetition within the N or P condition. Dropping the order effects, we 
can aggregate the NP and PN data and re-estimate the regressions using the aggregated 
data. The results are reported in Table 4. The constant terms continue to be significant for 
the small-group and high-MPCR large-group cases (p = 0.000 in both cases). For the 
low-MPCR large-group treatment, the constant term now attains marginal significance (p 
= 0.079), yielding some weak evidence that punishment has an effect on contributions 
even in this case. However, the effectiveness of the punishment condition at increasing 
contributions is significantly lower in the low-MPCR large-group treatment than in either 
the small-group (p = 0.001) or the high-MPCR large-group (p = 0.017) treatments by the 
last round of each condition. Once again, group size has no significant effect for a 
constant high MPCR. 
Is the punishment condition less effective in the low-MPCR large-group treatment 
simply because fewer punishments are purchased when the potential gains from further 
contributions are relatively small? The last column of Table 1 presents per-capita 
expenditures on punishment for each treatment. In both orders, such expenditures appear 
to be substantially higher in the high-MPCR large-group (high MGR) treatment than in 
the other two treatments. To investigate this issue further, we regress per-capita 
expenditures on punishment in each session aggregated over all ten punishment rounds 
on the same dummy variables representing the different treatments as used above. The 	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results are presented in Table 5 for the different dummy-variable codings. None of the 
order effects or their interactions with the treatment dummy variables is significant. 
While per-capita punishment expenditures in the high-MPCR large group treatment are 
significantly higher than in both the small group treatment (p = 0.000 and p = 0.001 for 
the NP and PN orders respectively) and the low-MPCR large group treatment (p = 0.001 
and p = 0.023 for the NP and PN orders respectively), there is no significant difference in 
per-capita punishment expenditures between the small-group and the low-MPCR large 
group treatments for either order. A joint test that the coefficients on the main order effect 
together with those on its interactions with the two other treatment dummies all equal 
zero yields an F(3, 26) statistic of 0.80 (p = 0.5057). Dropping these order effects leads to 
qualitatively identical inferences.
4 
While per-capita expenditures on punishment are significantly higher in the high-
MPCR large-group treatment than in the other two treatments, the effectiveness of the 
punishment condition at increasing contributions is significantly higher in both the high-
MPCR large-group treatment and the small-group treatment than in the low-MPCR large-
group treatment.  Thus, statistically indistinguishable levels of per-capita spending on 
punishment are significantly more effective at increasing contributions in the small-group 
treatment than in the low-MPCR large group treatment. Moreover, significantly higher 
levels of per-capita spending in the high-MPCR treatment relative to the small-group 
treatment produce increases in contributions that are statistically indistinguishable from 
each other. We hypothesize that this reflects a coordination problem that afflicts the 
decentralized punishment mechanism in large groups, making per-capita expenditures on 
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punishment less effective at increasing contributions in such groups.  
Suppose for example that 25% of participants are low contributors. In a group of 
four, this implies that there is just one low contributor and three higher contributors who 
might decide to punish him or her. Suppose that each high contributor purchases one 
punishment point. The low contributor will receive three punishment points, perhaps an 
inducement to contribute more in the next round. In an analogous group of 40, there 
would be ten low contributors and thirty higher contributors who might decide to punish 
one or more of the ten low contributors. If each high contributor purchases one 
punishment point, the ten low contributors will together receive thirty punishment points, 
an average of three per person. It is possible that these thirty punishment points will be 
divided equally among the ten low contributors. In that case, each low contributor will 
receive three punishment points just as in the small four-person group. However, there is 
no mechanism to coordinate the distribution of punishment points among the low 
contributors. Therefore, it is unlikely that they will be distributed equally. Instead it is 
probable that some low contributors will receive more punishment points than necessary 
to motivate higher contributions, while others will receive fewer or none at all. 
Table 6 presents summary data on the proportion of “low” contributors that 
received at least one punishment point for each treatment. We use two definitions of a 
low contributor. The first is a relative definition. It defines a contributor to be low if 
his/her contribution is at or below the 25
th percentile in a round and s/he is not one of the 
highest contributors in that round. The second is primarily an absolute definition. It 
defines those contributing ten or fewer tokens as low contributors as long as they are not 
among the highest contributors in the round. According to both definitions, the proportion 	 ﾠ 12	 ﾠ
of low contributors receiving at least one punishment point was substantially lower in the 
low-MPCR large group treatment than in either of the other two treatments in both the 
NP and PN orders.  
To determine whether there is a significant difference in the likelihood of a low 
contributor being punished in the low-MPCR large group treatment than in the other two 
treatments, we employed a negative binomial regression for each definition of a low 
contributor. For each group of participants, we have one count of the number of times a 
low contributor received at least one punishment aggregated across all rounds. This is the 
dependent variable. In addition, we calculate the number of times a low contribution 
occurred aggregated across all rounds, the log of which is used as the exposure variable.
5 
To facilitate interpretation, the coefficients are reported in the form of incidence rate 
ratios (IRRs). 
Table 7 presents the results for the relative definition. Consider the reported IRR 
for mpcr_low in regression 1, which is 0.593. This means that the estimated rate at which 
low contributors received at least one punishment in the low-MPCR large-group 
treatment was 59.3% as high as the analogous rate in the small-group treatment for the 
NP order. Since the p-value is 0.007, this is a significant difference. Similarly, in 
regression 2 the IRR for mpcr_low indicates that the rate at which low contributors 
received at least one punishment in the low-MPCR large group treatment was 46.5% as 
high as the analogous rate in the high-MPCR large-group treatment (p = 0.000). Notice 
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that the IRR in regression 3 for mpcr_high contains the same information, indicating that 
the incidence rate in the high-MPCR large-group treatment is 214.9% as high as the rate 
in the low-MPCR large group treatment, where 214.9% is the reciprocal of 46.5%. For 
the PN order, the incidence rate for the low-MPCR large-group treatment was 70.6% of 
the rate for the small-group treatment with marginal significance (p = 0.066), while the 
rate for the low-MPCR large-group treatment was 69.4% of the rate for the high-MPCR 
large-group treatment (p = 0.053). There is no significant difference between the 
incidence rates for the small-group versus the high-MPCR large-group treatment in either 
the NP or PN order. Moreover, there are no significant order effects. A joint test of the 
null hypothesis that the order effect and its interactions with the treatment variables all 
equal zero yields a chi-square statistic of 3.41 with three degrees of freedom (p = 0.332). 
Thus, the null hypothesis of no order effects or interactions involving order effects cannot 
be rejected. Dropping these order effects and reestimating this negative binomial 
regression leads to the likelihood of low contributors receiving at least one punishment 
being significantly lower in the low-MPCR large-group treatment than in either the 
small-group (p = 0.003) or the high-MPCR large-group (p = 0.000) treatment. As before, 
there is no significant difference between the incidence rates for the small-group versus 
the high-MPCR large-group treatment (p = 0.370).
6 
Table 8 presents the results for the primarily absolute definition of low 
contributor. There are marginally significant order effects for the high-MPCR large group 
treatments (p = 0.081) and a significant interaction between the effect of MPCR and 
order (p = 0.048). However, the treatment effects are robust to the altered definition of 
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low contributor. The incidence rate for the low-MPCR large group treatment is 
significantly lower than for the small-group treatment (p = 0.000 for both the NP and PN 
orders) and significantly lower than for the high-MPCR large group treatment (p = 0.000 
for the NP and p = 0.003 for the PN order). There is no significant difference between the 
incidence rates for the small-group versus the high-MPCR large group treatment in either 
order.  
These results together corroborate the coordination hypothesis, supporting the 
idea that a given per-capita expenditure on decentralized individual punishments is more 
efficient at increasing contributions for smaller than for larger groups. In small groups, 
for a given level of per-capita expenditures, a higher proportion of low contributors 
receive at least one punishment than in large groups. This is the reason that statistically 
indistinguishable amounts of expenditure on punishment are significantly more effective 
in the small-group treatment than in the low-MPCR large-group treatment at increasing 
contributions. It is also the reason that the significantly higher expenditures on 
punishment observed in the high-MPCR large-group treatment relative to the small-group 
treatment are necessary to produce similar increases in contributions that are statistically 
indistinguishable from each other. 
IV. Conclusion 
  The effectiveness of the individual punishment mechanism at increasing 
contributions to a public good depends critically on what happens to the MPCR of a 
public good as the potential community of contributors grows. For a pure public good 
with non-rivalry in consumption, MPCR stays constant and MGR increases 	 ﾠ 15	 ﾠ
proportionally with the size of the community. In this paper, we have demonstrated that 
the higher MGR produces a significant increase in per-capita expenditures on punishment 
in 40-person relative to four-person groups. At the same time, the larger group creates a 
coordination problem for the decentralized punishment mechanism, making each dollar 
spent on punishment less effective at increasing contributions. This occurs because some 
punishment dollars are inevitably wasted on low contributors who are simultaneously 
punished sufficiently to increase their contributions by other purchasers of punishment 
points, while other low contributors escape punishment. In this experimental study, the 
increase in punishment expenditures was sufficient to offset the reduction in the 
efficiency of each punishment dollar. Thus, for a constant MPCR, the individual 
punishment mechanism proved remarkably robust despite the coordination problems 
inherent in an institution relying on decentralized individual punishment decisions in the 
context of a larger group.  
However, if the MGR stays constant, resulting in an MPCR that shrinks with 
group size, per-capita expenditures on punishment do not increase. In this case, the 
coordination problem associated with the 40-person group is not offset by increases in 
punishment expenditures. This results in the individual punishment mechanism being 
significantly less effective at increasing contributions for a 40-person than for a four-
person community with the same MGR. Examining institutional modifications to 
mitigate the coordination problem associated with the decentralized individual 
punishment mechanism is an important issue deserving further study. 
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Table 1: Data Summary (t-test p-values in parentheses) 










1: Small, NP, 
MPCR=0.4 








2: Large, NP, 
MPCR=0.4 








3: Large, NP, 
MPCR=0.04 







4: Small, PN, 
MPCR=0.4 








5: Large, PN, 
MPCR=0.4 







6: Large, PN, 
MPCR=0.04 
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Table 2:  Regression Results on Ten-Round Per-Capita Differences in Contributions between the 
Punishment and No-Punishment Conditions (p-values in parentheses) 
  Reg. 1  Reg. 2  Reg. 3  Reg. 4  Reg. 5  Reg. 6 





















MPCR_High      32.54 
(0.044) 
    7.36 
(0.648) 
MGR_High  -4.68 
(0.741) 
    5.69 
(0.688) 
   














     















MPCRH x Order      -25.18 
(0.269) 
    25.18 
(0.269) 
MGRH x Order  10.37 
(0.604) 
    -10.37 
(0.604) 
   








Observations  560  560  560  560  560  560 
Number of groups  32  32  32  32  32  32 
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Table 3: Regression Results on Last-Round Per-Capita Differences in Contributions between the 
Punishment and No-Punishment Conditions (p-values in parentheses) 
  Reg. 1  Reg. 2  Reg. 3  Reg. 4  Reg. 5  Reg. 6 
Constant  12.275  10.100  3.442  9.000  8.375  2.892 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.186)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.266) 
MPCR_Low  -8.833  -6.658    -6.108  -5.483   
  (0.005)  (0.070)    (0.052)  (0.136)   
MPCR_High      6.658      5.483 
      (0.070)      (0.136) 
MGR_High  -2.175      -0.625     
  (0.490)      (0.843)     
Small    2.175  2.175    0.625  0.625 
    (0.490)  (0.490)    (0.843)  (0.843) 
Order_PN  -3.275  -1.725  -0.550       
  (0.191)  (0.639)  (0.881)       
Order_NP        3.275  1.725  0.550 
        (0.191)  (0.639)  (0.881) 
MPCRL X Order  2.725  1.175    -2.725  -1.175   
  (0.540)  (0.821)    (0.540)  (0.821)   
MPCRH X Order      -1.175      1.175 
      (0.821)      (0.821) 
MGR X Order  1.550      -1.550     
  (0.728)      (0.728)     
Small X Order    -1.550  -1.550    1.550  1.550 
    (0.728)  (0.728)    (0.728)  (0.728) 
Observations  560  560  560  560  560  560 
Number of groups  32  32  32  32  32  32 
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Table 4: Regression Results on Last-Round Per-Capita Differences in Contributions between the 
Punishment and No-Punishment Conditions Dropping Insignificant Order Effects (p-values in 
parentheses) 
  Reg. 1  Reg. 2  Reg. 3 
Constant  10.638  -9.238  3.167 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.079) 
MPCR_Low  -7.47  -6.07   
  (0.001)  (0.017)   
MPCR_High      6.07 
      (0.017) 
MGR_High  -1.40     
  (0.522)     
Small    1.40  1.40 
    (0.522)  (0.522) 
Observations  560  560  560 
Number of groups  32  32  32 
R squared  0.154  0.154  0.154 	 ﾠ 22	 ﾠ
Table 5: Regression Results on Ten-Round Per-Capita Expenditures on Punishment (p-values in 
parentheses) 
  Reg. 1  Reg. 2  Reg. 3  Reg. 4  Reg. 5  Reg. 6 
Constant  10.600  32.892  8.467  26.300  9.675 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.093) 
6.075 
(0.031)  (0.000)  (0.057) 
MPCR_Low  -2.133  -24.425    3.600  -16.625   
  (0.703)  (0.001)    (0.521)  (0.023)   
MPCR_High      24.425      16.625 
      (0.001)      (0.023) 
MGR_High  22.292      20.225     
  (0.000)      (0.001)     
Small    -22.292   -22.292     -20.225  -20.225 
    (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.001)  (0.001) 
Order_NP        4.525  6.592  -1.208 
        (0.240)  (0.346)  (0.862) 
Order_PN  -4.525  -6.592  1.208       
  (0.240)  (0.346)  (0.862)       
MPCRL X Order  5.733  7.800    -5.733  -7.800   
  (0.471)  (0.429)    (0.471)  (0.429)   
MPCRH X Order      -7.800      7.800 
      (0.429)      (0.429) 
MGR X Order  -2.067      2.067     
  (0.794)      (0.794)     
Small X Order    2.067  2.067    -2.067  -2.067 
    (0.794)  (0.794)    (0.794)  (0.794) 
Observations  32  32  32  32  32  32 
Adjusted R 
squared 
0.475	 ﾠ 0.475	 ﾠ 0.475	 ﾠ 0.475	 ﾠ 0.475	 ﾠ 0.475	 ﾠ
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Table 6: Proportion of Low Contributors Punished averaged across Sessions by Treatment for 
Two Definitions of Low Contributor 




or Lower and 
not Highest in 
Round 
Ten or Lower 
and not Highest 
in Round 
1: Small, NP, 
MPCR=0.4  10  0.609  0.606 
2: Large, NP, 
MPCR=0.4  3  0.761  0.741 
3: Large, NP, 
MPCR=0.04  3  0.347  0.188 
4: Small, PN, 
MPCR=0.4  10  0.674 0.538 
5: Large, PN, 
MPCR=0.4  3  0.689  0.486 
6: Large, PN, 
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Table 7: Negative Binomial Regression Results for the Proportion of Times People in the Lowest 
Contribution Quartile and were not among the Highest Contributors in a Round were Punished 
(p-values in parentheses) 
  Reg. 1  Reg. 2  Reg. 3  Reg. 4  Reg. 5  Reg. 6 
MPCR_Low  0.593  0.465    0.706  0.694   
  (0.007)  (0.000)    (0.066)  (0.053)   
MPCR_High      2.149      1.441 
      (0.000)      (0.053) 
MGR_High  1.276      1.017     
  (0.202)      (0.929)     
Small    0.784  0.784    0.983  0.983 
    (0.202)  (0.202)    (0.929)  (0.929) 
Order_NP        0.869  1.090  0.731 
        (0.462)  (0.646)  (0.103) 
Order_PN  1.151  0.917  1.369       
  (0.462)  (0.646)  (0.103)       
MPCRL X Order  1.189  1.492    0.841  0.670   
  (0.522)  (0.137)    (0.522)  (0.137)   
MPCRH X Order      0.670      1.492 
      (0.137)      (0.137) 
MGR X Order  0.797      1.254     
  (0.397)      (0.397)     
Small X Order    1.254  1.254    0.797  0.797 
    (0.397)  (0.397)    (0.397)  (0.397) 
Observations  32  32  32  32  32  32 
Pseudo R squared  0.061	 ﾠ 0.061	 ﾠ 0.061	 ﾠ 0.061  0.061  0.061	 ﾠ
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Table 8: Negative Binomial Regression Results for the Proportion of Times People who 
Contributed Ten or Less and were not among the Highest Contributors in a Round were 
Punished (p-values in parentheses) 
  Reg. 1  Reg. 2  Reg. 3  Reg. 4  Reg. 5  Reg. 6 
MPCR_Low  0.347  0.260    0.407  0.505   
  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.003)   
MPCR_High      3.844      1.980 
      (0.000)      (0.003) 
MGR_High  1.335      0.805     
  (0.228)      (0.319)     
Small    0.749  0.749    1.242  1.242 
    (0.228)  (0.228)    (0.319)  (0.319) 
Size_large             
             
Order_NP        0.928  1.538  0.792 
        (0.720)  (0.081)  (0.304) 
Order_PN  1.078  0.650  1.263       
  (0.720)  (0.081)  (0.304)       
MPCRL X Order  1.171  1.942    0.854  0.515   
  (0.608)  (0.048)    (0.608)  (0.048)   
MPCRH X Order      0.515      1.942 
      (0.048)      (0.048) 
MGR X Order  0.603      1.658     
  (0.119)      (0.119)     
Small X Order    1.658  1.658    0.603  0.603 
    (0.119)  (0.119)    (0.119)  (0.119) 
Observations  32  32  32  32  32  32 
Pseudo R squared  0.104	 ﾠ 0.104	 ﾠ 0.104	 ﾠ 0.104	 ﾠ 0.104	 ﾠ 0.104	 ﾠ
 